"Just Right": The Goldilocks Theory of Sanctions Busting's Causes

When sender states impose economic sanctions on target states, are the commercially lucrative opportunities for third-party sanctions busters the same across all target states? I develop a time-series cross-sectional data sets using UN Comtrade data between 1963 and 2011 to illustrate how variation in a target state's economic size impacts the likelihood of sanctions busting. I develop a "Goldilocks" theory of target choice, arguing that target states with medium-sized economies are "just right" with a higher probability of receiving sanctions busting trade than smaller- and larger-sized economies. These "just right" economies likely generate higher rents and more commercially lucrative opportunities than smaller- and larger-sized sanctioned economies. This study has implications for policymakers in that the very policies imposing sanctions tend to target medium-sized economies more frequently. Thus, economic sanctions may stimulate sanctions busting trade and undermine the very behavior these foreign policies are meant to correct.