Level 3 Income and CEO Cash Compensation in the Financial Industry

被引:0
|
作者
Young, Chaur-Shiuh [1 ]
Tsai, Liu-Ching [2 ]
Hsu, Hui-Wen [3 ]
机构
[1] Natl Cheng Kung Univ, Tainan, Taiwan
[2] Natl Chiayi Univ, Chiayi, Taiwan
[3] Feng Chia Univ, Taichung, Taiwan
来源
关键词
Level; 3; income; fair value accounting; SFAS; 157; CEO compensation; clawback problem; VALUE HIERARCHY INFORMATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SFAS; 157; FAIR; PERFORMANCE; EARNINGS; SENSITIVITY; INVESTMENT; LOSSES;
D O I
10.1177/0148558X221080300
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This article examines the role of fair value gains or losses related to Level 3 valuations in CEO cash compensation for U.S. financial firms. Our results show that Level 3 income is compensation-relevant. By separating Level 3 income into unrealized and realized Level 3 income, we find that CEO cash compensation is less sensitive to unrealized than realized Level 3 income, which indicates that compensation committees have a higher concern for the clawback problem associated with unrealized Level 3 income. A further analysis separating Level 3 income into positive and negative components shows that Level 3 losses are more compensation-relevant than Level 3 gains, thereby validating the argument that Level 3 losses are more credible than Level 3 gains. Overall, we find that Level 3 income is relevant for CEO cash compensation and that this phenomenon is mainly driven by its realized and loss components.
引用
收藏
页码:568 / 588
页数:21
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