Pre-electoral coalitions and cabinet stability in presidential systems

Previous research on coalition stability in presidential systems has relied to a substantial extent on the parliamentary literature. By focusing on the post-electoral bargaining environment, these approaches have neglected the key role played by pre-electoral agreements formed around the winning presidential candidate in the making and breaking of coalitions under presidentialism. We claim that cabinets derived from pre-electoral coalition should foster trust and reduce uncertainty regarding partners' future behaviour. However, the positive effect of pre-electoral coalitions over cabinet duration is conditional on cabinet status, that is, the control of a legislative majority or near majority. Therefore, we argue that pre-electoral coalition cabinets holding a majority or near majority of seats will be more durable than purely post-electoral majority coalitions, whereas minority pre-electoral coalition cabinets congruent should endure less than minority post-electoral coalition cabinets. We test these hypotheses using a dataset of pre- and post-electoral coalitions in 11 Latin American countries.