Competition-cooperation mechanism of online supply chain finance based on a stochastic evolutionary game

To solve the cooperation and competition problem of online supply chain finance constructed by the high-speed development of online finance among e-commerce enterprises and commercial banks, this paper constructs a classic evolutionary game model that does not consider disturbances and a stochastic evolutionary game model considering random disturbance. A contrastive analysis of the evolutionary process and stability of strategy selection is made, and parameters for the cooperative contract are discussed. Finally, the relevant decisions are verified by a numerical simulation of contracts in Chinese online supply chain finance. The main conclusions are as follows: in the classic evolutionary game model, the probability of choosing a cooperative strategy in a high-penalty contract is more than that in a low-penalty contract, and their final strategies will stabilize at cooperation when the excess return is more than that of the competitive strategy. In the stochastic evolutionary game model, the stable conditions are stricter than those of the classic model. Moreover, the default penalty, cost of maintaining cooperation, revenue share proportion and stochastic disturbance intensity influence the dynamic evolutionary process in the stochastic evolutionary game model. The conclusions provide a reference for the cooperation of e-commerce enterprises and banks in building online supply chain finance to achieve a win-win result.