On the Nature of Practical Reason (Phronesis) in Aristotle

被引:0
|
作者
Mutlu, Esra Cagri [1 ]
Mutlu, Baris [2 ]
Yogurtcu, Gokce [2 ]
机构
[1] Burdur Mehmet Akif Ersoy Univ, Sosyal Bilimler Meslek Yuksekokulu, TR-15000 Burdur, Turkiye
[2] Kyrgyz Turkish Manas Univ, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitusu, Biskek 54000, Kyrgyzstan
来源
关键词
Practical reasoning; major premise; minor premise; desire; action;
D O I
10.29228/beytulhikme.68167
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Aristotle's views of practical reasoning/wisdom (phronesis) are closely linked to his account of action (praxis). When it comes to practical reasoning, its relation with virtues, which are divided into two as intellectual and ethical virtues by Aristotle, is extremely important. To make this relation clearer, first, the connection of practical thinking with theoretical thinking and therefore with the intellectual virtues was questioned. For example, it has been tried to understand whether the rational deliberation in practical reasoning works like theoretical deliberation or whether it proceeds in a different way. In addition, the relation between the wish, desire and intuitive reason and the connection with the action of the person concerned were questioned through the major and minor premises of practical thinking. In this discussion, we will try to understand how practical reasoning takes place in Aristotle, in the context of the interpretations we will mention, that is, the way practical and theoretical thinking progresses, the premises and results they deal with, and their ends.
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页码:176 / 198
页数:23
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