Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study

被引：0
|
作者：
Newman, Neil [1 ]
Leyton-Brown, Kevin [1 ]
Milgrom, Paul [2 ]
Segal, Ilya [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ British Columbia, Dept Comp Sci, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada
[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源：
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2024年 / 70卷 / 11期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会; 加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词：
incentive auction; deferred acceptance auction; reverse clock auction; spectrum auction; simulation; market design; auctions; artificial intelligence; applied game theory; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; SPECTRUM;
D O I：
10.1287/mnsc.2020.02489
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
This paper revisits the descending clock "reverse" auction design used in the U.S. Federal Communications Commission's 2016-2017 "incentive auction." We use extensive computational simulations to investigate the quantitative significance of various aspects of the design, leveraging a reverse auction simulator and realistic models of bidder values.
引用
收藏
页码：8187 / 8215
页数：30
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