Effects of interdependent network reciprocity on the evolution of public cooperation

This paper investigates the impact of resource interaction between interdependent net-works on public cooperation. The resource interaction is staged between the upper and bottom two-layer network and reallocates payoffs depending on the gap between the bottom network average payoff and players' payoff. It is shown that such a redistribu-tion mechanism effective the cooperation level on the upper network presents a non-monotonic influence, while the network reciprocity fails on the bottom network with the increment of resource interaction strength parameter & alpha;. By examining the behavior of sponsors and recipients within cooperators and defectors, the equilibrium state can be at-tributed to the evolution of correlated cooperator pairs between interdependent networks. Our results provided a theoretical analysis of the group cooperation induced by the re-source interaction factors.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.