Price level targeting under fiscal dominance

被引:1
|
作者
Ascari, Guido [1 ,4 ,5 ,6 ]
Florio, Anna [2 ]
Gobbi, Alessandro [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pavia, Dept Econ, Via San Felice 5, I-27100 Pavia, Italy
[2] Politecn Milan, Dept Management Econ & Ind Engn, Via Lambruschini 4-B, I-20156 Milan, Italy
[3] Univ Milan, Dept Environm Sci & Policy, Via Celoria 2, I-20133 Milan, Italy
[4] Nederlandsche Bank, Spaklerweg 4, NL-1096 BA Amsterdam, Netherlands
[5] Univ Pavia, Pavia, Italy
[6] Nederelandsche Bank, Amsterdam, Netherlands
关键词
Price level targeting; Monetary and fiscal policy interactions; MONETARY-POLICY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2023.102876
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The adoption of a "makeup" strategy has been one of the proposals in the review of the Fed's monetary policy framework. Another suggestion, to avoid the zero lower bound, has been a more active role for fiscal policy. We put together these ideas to study price level targeting under a fiscally-led regime. We find that following a deflationary demand shock: (i) the central bank should increase (rather than decrease) the policy rate; (ii) the central bank, thus, avoids the zero lower bound; (iii) price level targeting is welfare im-proving with respect to inflation targeting, unless one considers a nonstandard inflation targeting rule with a negative inflation coefficient and a high degree of smoothing. & COPY; 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页数:32
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