PRICING AND QUALITY DECISIONS IN A SUPPLY CHAIN WITH CONSUMERS' PRIVACY CONCERN

This study considers a supply chain consists of one manufacturer produces a product with a quality level and sells it through one retailer. A stylized model is developed to investigate the impacts of consumers' privacy concerns on pricing, quality decisions, and profitability through the relationship between product quality and personal information. When consumers' privacy concern is considered, the product quality level, the wholesale price, the payoffs of the manufacturer and retailer, and consumer surplus decrease with the personal information loss, whereas the selling price increases if this loss is low. Our results also show that the retailer prefers to charge a high selling price if the information benefit and the personal information loss are low, or the information benefit is relatively high. Moreover, a "win-win-win" outcome can be achieved among the manufacturer, retailer, and consumers if the personal information loss is sufficiently low. In the case of quality-differentiated products, however, although the manufacturer improves the product quality level, the wholesale prices are increased if the information benefit and the personal information loss are low, or the information benefit is high.