Backgrounds With Benefits? Rebel Group Origins and Concessions During Civil Wars in Africa

被引:0
|
作者
Braithwaite, Jessica Maves [1 ,4 ]
Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Arizona, Sch Govt & Publ Policy, Tucson, AZ USA
[2] Univ Maryland, Dept Govt & Polit, College Pk, MD USA
[3] Peace Res Inst Oslo, Oslo, Norway
[4] Univ Arizona, Sch Govt & Publ Policy, 343 Social Sci Bldg, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
关键词
civil wars; rebellion; internal armed conflict; bargaining; negotiation; TERRORISM; CONFLICT; NETWORKS; DURATION; SUPPORT; RESPOND; CONTEXT; LOGIC; PEACE; POWER;
D O I
10.1177/00220027231211792
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Why do governments make concessions to some rebels but not others? We argue that the origins of rebel groups influence the bargaining process, and the government's willingness to make concessions in particular. Rebel groups inherit different resource endowments - community ties and military expertise - from pre-existing "parent" organizations. These resource endowments are visible to the government, and they provide critical information about the likely durability of the rebellion. We expect that rebel group origins facilitating these endowments are associated with the state offering concessions earlier in the conflict. Employing original data on rebel group origins, as well as information on government concessions during post-Cold War African conflicts, we find general support for our expectations, although not all types of parent organizations are equally beneficial to rebel groups when it comes to extracting concessions from the state.
引用
收藏
页数:26
相关论文
共 6 条