Online Distributed Schedule Randomization to Mitigate Timing Attacks in Industrial Control Systems

被引:0
|
作者
Samaddar, Ankita [1 ]
Easwaran, Arvind [1 ]
机构
[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Singapore, Singapore
关键词
Real-time networks; industrial control systems; timing attacks; schedule randomization; period adaptation; security; WirelessHART; STABILITY;
D O I
10.1145/3624584
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Industrial control systems (ICSs) consist of a large number of control applications that are associated with periodic real-time flows with hard deadlines. To facilitate large-scale integration, remote control, and coordination, wireless sensor and actuator networks form the main communication framework in most ICSs. Among the existing wireless sensor and actuator network protocols, WirelessHART is the most suitable protocol for real-time applications in ICSs. The communications in a WirelessHART network are time-division multiple access based. To satisfy the hard deadlines of the real-time flows, the schedule in a WirelessHART network is pre-computed. The same schedule is repeated over every hyperperiod (i.e., lowest common multiple of the periods of the flows). However, a malicious attacker can exploit the repetitive behavior of the flow schedules to launch timing attacks (e.g., selective jamming attacks). To mitigate timing attacks, we propose an online distributed schedule randomization strategy that randomizes the time-slots in the schedules at each network device without violating the flow deadlines, while ensuring the closed-loop control stability. To increase the extent of randomization in the schedules further, and to reduce the energy consumption of the system, we incorporate a period adaptation strategy that adjusts the transmission periods of the flows depending on the stability of the control loops at runtime. We use Kullback-Leibler divergence and prediction probability of slots as two metrics to evaluate the performance of our proposed strategy. We compare our strategy with an offline centralized schedule randomization strategy. Experimental results show that the schedules generated by our strategy are 10% to 15% more diverse and 5% to 10% less predictable on average compared to the offline strategy when the number of base schedules and keys vary between 4 and 6 and 12 and 32, respectively, under all slot utilization (number of occupied slots in a hyperperiod). On incorporating period adaptation, the divergence in the schedules reduceat each period increase with 46% less power consumption on average.
引用
收藏
页数:39
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] A schedule randomization policy to mitigate timing attacks in WirelessHART networks
    Samaddar, Ankita
    Easwaran, Arvind
    Tan, Rui
    [J]. REAL-TIME SYSTEMS, 2020, 56 (04) : 452 - 489
  • [2] A schedule randomization policy to mitigate timing attacks in WirelessHART networks
    Ankita Samaddar
    Arvind Easwaran
    Rui Tan
    [J]. Real-Time Systems, 2020, 56 : 452 - 489
  • [3] Online Schedule Randomization to Mitigate Timing Attacks in 5G Periodic URLLC Communications
    Samaddar, Ankita
    Easwaran, Arvind
    [J]. ACM TRANSACTIONS ON SENSOR NETWORKS, 2023, 19 (04)
  • [4] Low delay network attributes randomization to proactively mitigate reconnaissance attacks in industrial control systems
    Etxezarreta, Xabier
    Garitano, Inaki
    Iturbe, Mikel
    Zurutuza, Urko
    [J]. WIRELESS NETWORKS, 2024, 30 (06) : 5077 - 5091
  • [5] TaskShuffler: A Schedule Randomization Protocol for Obfuscation Against Timing Inference Attacks in Real-Time Systems
    Yoon, Man-Ki
    Mohan, Sibin
    Chen, Chien-Ying
    Sha, Lui
    [J]. 2016 IEEE REAL-TIME AND EMBEDDED TECHNOLOGY AND APPLICATIONS SYMPOSIUM (RTAS), 2016,
  • [6] A dependable architecture to mitigate distributed denial of service attacks on network-based control systems
    Beitollahi, Hakem
    Deconinck, Geert
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, 2011, 4 (3-4) : 107 - 123
  • [7] Practical Evaluation of Poisoning Attacks on Online Anomaly Detectors in Industrial Control Systems
    Kravchik, Moshe
    Demetrio, Luca
    Biggio, Battista
    Shabtai, Asaf
    [J]. COMPUTERS & SECURITY, 2022, 122
  • [8] Virus attacks industrial control systems
    不详
    [J]. CONTROL ENGINEERING, 2010, 57 (06) : 18 - 18
  • [9] On Using Distributed Control Schemes to Mitigate Switching Attacks in Smart Grids
    Farraj, Abdallah
    Hammad, Eman
    Kundur, Deepa
    [J]. 2015 IEEE 28TH CANADIAN CONFERENCE ON ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING (CCECE), 2015, : 1578 - 1582
  • [10] Control Logic Injection Attacks on Industrial Control Systems
    Yoo, Hyunguk
    Ahmed, Irfan
    [J]. ICT SYSTEMS SECURITY AND PRIVACY PROTECTION, SEC 2019, 2019, 562 : 33 - 48