Threshold BBS plus Signatures for Distributed Anonymous Credential Issuance

We propose a secure multiparty signing protocol for the BBS+ signature scheme; in other words, an anonymous credential scheme with threshold issuance. We prove that due to the structure of the BBS+ signature, simply verifying the signature produced by an otherwise semi-honest protocol is sufficient to achieve composable security against a malicious adversary. Consequently, our protocol is extremely simple and efficient: it involves a single request from the client (who requires a signature) to the signing parties, two exchanges of messages among the signing parties, and finally a response to the client; in some deployment scenarios the concrete cost bottleneck may be the client's local verification of the signature that it receives. Furthermore, our protocol can be extended to support the strongest form of blind signing and to serve as a distributed evaluation protocol for the DodisYampolskiy Oblivious VRF. We validate our efficiency claims by implementing and benchmarking our protocol.