This essay examines the ways in which pre-modern Muslim jurists adapted their legal methods to accommodate the complexity of the act of listening to music. I classify those methods from the least to the most inclusive of underlying notions of moral value. This study shows that models on opposite ends of the spectrum function in similar ways. Whether, as in Ibn Hazm's work, the scope of legal norms is confined to the immediate textual meaning, or, as in Ibn Taymiyya's thought, the formulation of norms corresponds to an underlying moral aim, the result is a broad treatment of all phenomena that relate to music (samaMODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING). By contrast, Ghazali's discussion of samaMODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RING is guided by the need to attain conviction of the appropriate course of action rather than the pursuit of an objective truth about the legal-moral status of the act of listening to music, resulting in a subtle case-by-case evaluation, rather than an overarching judgment. While this study does not attempt to give a comprehensive historical account of how and why scholars of Islamic law attempted to restrict or permit certain musical experiences, we can ultimately see how the shariMODIFIER LETTER LEFT HALF RINGa, a legal system that is fundamentally concerned with moral behavior, purported to advance reasonable models for the assessment and regulation of complex social phenomena.
