Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness as an Integrated Information Theorist

被引:4
|
作者
Chis-Ciure, Robert [1 ]
Ellia, Francesco [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bucharest, Fac Philosophy, Dept Theoret Philosophy, Bucharest, Romania
[2] Univ Bologna, Dept Philosophy & Commun Studies, Bologna, Italy
关键词
Consciousness; Hard problem; Conceivability argument; Integrated information theory; Physicalism; Russellian monism;
D O I
10.1007/s10699-020-09724-7
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
In this paper we provide a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem of consciousness and the implications of conceivability scenarios for current neuroscientific research. In particular, we focus on one of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT). After a brief introduction on IIT, we present Chalmers' original formulation and propose our own layered view of the hard problem, showing how 2 separate issues can be distinguished. More specifically, we argue that it's possible to disentangle a core problem of consciousness from a layered hard problem, the latter being essentially connected to Chalmers' conceivability argument. We then assess the relation between the Hard Problem and IIT, showing how the theory resists conceivability scenarios, and how it is equipped to face up to the hard problem in its broadest acceptation.
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页码:255 / 271
页数:17
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