Fighting the last war: Is presidential hindsight 20-20?

被引:0
|
作者
Groves, Bryan N. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] US Army Forces Command, Ft Bragg, NC USA
[2] US Army Forces Command, Ft Bragg, NC 28307 USA
关键词
9; 11; presidential decision making; quagmire; security and strategic studies; Vietnam War; COMMITMENT; ESCALATION; DECISION; REGRET;
D O I
10.1111/psq.12821
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Fighting the last war lays out the contours of a theoretical framework that explains U.S. presidential decisions to cut losses or double down on major post-Vietnam military conflicts. The archival sources and principal interviews give readers an insider's look into presidents' conflict decision making. The article explains how the Vietnam War catastrophe shaped Presidents Reagan and Clinton's attempts to avoid a similar quagmire in Lebanon in 1983-1984 and Somalia in 1993, respectively. It then shows how new lessons from 9/11 and beyond shaped Presidents Bush and Obama's decisions to surge troops and employ counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq (2007) and Afghanistan (2009). While Vietnam-era lessons remained important to all these presidents, pre-9/11 they believed entrapment risks from incremental escalation were worse than de-escalation risks. After 9/11, the logic flipped.
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页码:47 / 76
页数:30
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