Behavioral vaccination policies and game-environment feedback in epidemic dynamics

Many policymakers have adopted voluntary vaccination policies to alleviate the consequences of contagious diseases. Such policies have several well-established feathers, i.e. they are seasonal, depending on an individual's decision, adaptive, and control epidemic activity. Here, we study ideas from behavioral epidemiology embedded with a vaccination game and pairwise two-player two-strategy game to represent the environmental feedback in an SVIR model by using a composite information index including disease incidence, vaccine factors and cooperative behavior on a global time scale (repeated season). In its turn, the information index's game dynamics to participate in the vaccine program (cooperation) is supposed to reflect the feedback-evolving dynamics of competitive cognitions and the environment. The assuming model is described by two different evolutionary game systems connected by an unknown external public opinion environment feedback. The embedded model is described by an inherited system showing a behavioral aspect, i.e. pairwise game indicates an individual's cooperative behavior, and a vaccine game refers to vaccine-cost influence. This is a novel attempt to stabilize the two different decision processes to pool them into a single index. Extensive simulations suggest a rich spectrum of achievable results, including epidemic control, human behavior, social dilemma, and policy suggestions.