Labor Market Regulation and Worker Power

被引:0
|
作者
Hafiz, Hiba [1 ,2 ]
Marinescu, Ioana [3 ,4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Boston Coll, Law Sch, Law, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA
[2] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[3] Univ Penn, Sch Social Policy & Practice, Philadelphia, PA USA
[4] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA USA
[5] US Dept Justice, Antitrust Div, Dallas, TX USA
来源
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW | 2023年 / 90卷 / 02期
关键词
WAGES; UNIONS; SEARCH; MODELS;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
Due to a lack of competition among employers in the labor market, employers have monopsony power, or power to pay workers less than what the workers contrib-ute to the employers' bottom line. "Worker power " is workers' ability to obtain higher wages and better working conditions. While the antitrust agencies have just begun developing policy and enforcement strategies to regulate employer monopsony, broader government policies that impact market forces, the formation of labor mar-ket institutions, and workers' voices and exit options also play a defining role in shaping worker power relative to employers. For example, in addition to antitrust enforcement, worker power can be enhanced by labor agencies' regulation of em-ployer/employee status, wage and working condition floors, and workers' collective action. Worker power can also be enhanced by agencies administering social safety net protections and influencing labor market tightness through monetary policy. Scholars have yet to assess how federal agencies, whose statutory authority and regulatory purview impact worker power, could best direct their authority, regula-tory tools, and expertise towards labor market regulation in the presence of employer monopsony power. This Essay outlines the comparative advantages of federal agen-cies' regulations impacting worker power. It then develops a checklist of worker power indicators for agencies to track and operationalize in high-priority policy and enforcement areas and offers a broader worker power agenda through a whole-of-government approach involving interagency coordination to protect and strengthen workers' voice and exit options.
引用
收藏
页码:469 / 509
页数:41
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