AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REFERRALS

被引：0
|
作者：
Lang, Youze [1 ,2 ]
Yang, Youzhi [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Fudan Univ, Inst Six Sect Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Adv Res, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[3] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Adv Res, 111 Wuchuan Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
来源：
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2024年 / 65卷 / 02期
关键词：
SOCIAL NETWORKS; MATCH QUALITY; JOB SEARCH; WAGE; EMPLOYMENT; CONTACTS;
D O I：
10.1111/iere.12671
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
About 40% of workers find their jobs through referrals. We distinguish between two types of referrals based on whether the referrer works at the hiring firm (internal referrals) or not (external referrals). Interestingly, jobs found through internal (external) referrals pay more (less) than those found through formal methods. An equilibrium labor market model is then built by introducing an incentive-compatible mechanism through which workers can share job opening information. A nondegenerate wage distribution arises in equilibrium with a wage premium (penalty) for internal (external) referrals. When calibrated, our model can capture these salient features of the U.S. labor market.
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页码：655 / 692
页数：38
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