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Can ESG ratings mitigate managerial myopia? Evidence from Chinese listed companies
被引:30
|作者:
Zhang, Jiawei
[1
]
Li, Yuan
[2
]
Xu, Hanwen
[3
]
Ding, Yi
[2
]
机构:
[1] Nanjing Univ, Business Sch, Nanjing 210093, Peoples R China
[2] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Accounting, Nanjing 210023, Peoples R China
[3] Jinan Univ, Guangzhou 510632, Peoples R China
关键词:
ESG rating;
Managerial myopia;
Accounting information quality;
Financing constraints;
Analyst attention;
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT;
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS;
ANALYST COVERAGE;
PROTECTION;
PERFORMANCE;
MARKETS;
SIDE;
D O I:
10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102878
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Managerial myopia has an important impact on the future development of companies and the legitimate rights of stakeholders; however, the impact of ESG ratings on managerial myopia is unclear. Based on the ESG rating data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2021, we constructed indicators of managerial myopia through text analysis and found that ESG ratings can significantly inhibit managerial myopia. The results of the mechanism tests show that ESG ratings inhibit managerial myopia by alleviating financing constraints, improving accounting information quality, and enhancing analysts' attention. The results of heterogeneity tests show that a higher degree of market competition indicates a more significant inhibitory effect of ESG ratings on managerial myopia. The economic consequences test revealed that ESG ratings can improve company performance by inhibiting managerial myopia. These conclusions provide important empirical evidence and suggestions for emerging market countries to use ESG ratings effectively to inhibit managerial myopia.
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页数:12
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