Why do family firms dismiss their family CEOs? A perspective on kinship ties

被引:3
|
作者
Yu, Xiaodong [1 ]
Sun, Shize [1 ]
Cheng, Xirong [2 ]
Lin, Yize [1 ]
Li, Huan [1 ]
机构
[1] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Business, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Beijing Technol & Business Univ, Sch Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China
来源
PLOS ONE | 2023年 / 18卷 / 05期
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH; EVOLUTIONARY; OWNERSHIP; BEHAVIOR; AGENCY; GOALS; COST;
D O I
10.1371/journal.pone.0285029
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Existing studies have suggested that nonfamily CEOs are more likely to be fired from family firms, while we focus on why family CEOs are also fired from family firms. Using data from 455 listed Chinese family firms, we find that family CEOs with affinity ties are more likely to be dismissed as they are not genetically related to the family. The difference becomes greater when firm performance is poor or family ownership is high. These findings elaborate that business-owing family is not a group with aligned interests, that is, family members with different family identities are treated differently within family. Besides, existing studies have emphasized that the preservation of socioemotional wealth in family firms can affect firms' operations, while this study further proposes that the preservation of socioemotional wealth can also have an impact on the business-owning families themselves.
引用
收藏
页数:14
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