Sector-Switching, Bureaucratic Reputation, and Citizen Evaluation of Performance: Evidence From a Large-Scale Experiment in India

被引:0
|
作者
Hameduddin, Taha [1 ,3 ]
Vivona, Roberto [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Kentucky, Martin Sch Publ Policy & Adm, Lexington, KY USA
[2] Nord Univ, Business Sch, Bodo, Norway
[3] Univ Kentucky, Martin Sch Publ Policy & Adm, 120 Patterson Dr, Lexington, KY 40506 USA
关键词
citizen evaluation of performance; privatization; reputation; performance management; India; PUBLIC-SECTOR; SIGNALING THEORY; MANAGEMENT; SERVICE; ORGANIZATIONS; GOVERNMENT; DECADE; REFORM; TRUST; STATE;
D O I
10.1177/00953997221147231
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
Amid crises of trust in government, the legitimacy of public organizations has never been more important. In this context, access to performance information ensures democratic control, and thus legitimacy. However, performance evaluation is hindered by transaction costs in accessing and cognitive biases in interpreting performance. We examine two antecedents of citizen evaluations of performance: sector, and bureaucratic reputation. Utilizing two experiments on a representative sample of Indian citizens, we situate our paper amid the increasing privatization of public services, and reputation management strategies used to influence performance evaluations. We discuss our findings and their implications for public management theory and practice.
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页码:457 / 484
页数:28
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