Algorithmic attention rents: A theory of digital platform market power

被引:2
|
作者
O'Reilly, Tim [1 ,2 ]
Strauss, Ilan [2 ]
Mazzucato, Mariana [2 ]
机构
[1] OReilly Media, Sebastopol, CA 95472 USA
[2] UCL Inst Innovat & Publ Purpose UCL IIPP, Bartlett Fac Built Environm, London, England
来源
DATA & POLICY | 2024年 / 6卷
关键词
advertising; algorithms; business models; platforms; regulation; ANTITRUST;
D O I
10.1017/dap.2024.1
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
We outline a theory of algorithmic attention rents in digital aggregator platforms. We explore the way that as platforms grow, they become increasingly capable of extracting rents from a variety of actors in their ecosystems-users, suppliers, and advertisers-through their algorithmic control over user attention. We focus our analysis on advertising business models, in which attention harvested from users is monetized by reselling the attention to suppliers or other advertisers, though we believe the theory has relevance to other online business models as well. We argue that regulations should mandate the disclosure of the operating metrics that platforms use to allocate user attention and shape the "free" side of their marketplace, as well as details on how that attention is monetized. Policy Significance Statement Today's big tech platforms can use their power over the attention of billions of users to shape the markets in which they participate for their own benefit, and against the interests of rivals, their users, and firms that depend on that flow of attention. Measures of market power based only on revenues and profit are insufficient for understanding these dynamics. To better regulate these attention-gatekeepers-and their coming AI -powered successors-we must mandate regular and consistent disclosures of the internal operating metrics that measure how they allocate attention, and develop a baseline understanding of what constitutes good behavior and what constitutes abuse.
引用
收藏
页数:25
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Market power and rents in global supply chains
    Swinnen, Johan F. M.
    Vandeplas, Anneleen
    [J]. AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 2010, 41 : 109 - 120
  • [2] TOWARD A THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURIAL RENTS: A SIMULATION OF THE MARKET PROCESS
    Keyhani, Mohammad
    Levesque, Moren
    Madhok, Anoop
    [J]. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 2015, 36 (01) : 76 - 96
  • [3] The power in digital literacy and algorithmic skill
    Csernoch, Maria
    Biro, Piroska
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NEW HORIZONS IN EDUCATION, INTE 2014, 2015, 174 : 550 - 559
  • [4] MARKET MAKING RENTS UNDER DISCRETE PRICES - THEORY AND EVIDENCE
    ANSHUMAN, VR
    KALAY, A
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1995, 50 (03): : 946 - 947
  • [5] Platform Logic as a Digital Market Order
    Kirchner, Stefan
    Beyer, Juergen
    [J]. ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SOZIOLOGIE, 2016, 45 (05): : 324 - 339
  • [6] Regulating Algorithmic Bias as a Key Element of Digital Market Regulation
    Csurgai-Horvath, Gergely
    [J]. WORLD COMPETITION, 2024, 47 (02): : 193 - 212
  • [7] Regulating digital platform power
    Evens, Tom
    Donders, Karen
    [J]. JOURNAL OF DIGITAL MEDIA & POLICY, 2020, 11 (03) : 235 - 239
  • [8] Coping with digital market re-organization: How the hotel industry strategically responds to digital platform power
    Balsiger, Philip
    Jammet, Thomas
    Cianferoni, Nicola
    Surdez, Muriel
    [J]. COMPETITION & CHANGE, 2023, 27 (01) : 163 - 183
  • [9] How Do Digital Market Platform Hosts Exercise Control Over Sellers? Digital Market Platform Sellers Control
    Danani, Shraddha Nimish
    Gogan, Janis L.
    Aeron, Prageet
    Sharma, Kirti
    Jaiswal, Mahadeo Prasad
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE IN ORGANIZATIONS, 2022, 20 (02)
  • [10] THEORY AND MEANS OF ALGORITHMIC AND ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN OF DIGITAL SBIS
    PRIKHOZHII, AA
    BRICH, VG
    [J]. IZVESTIYA VYSSHIKH UCHEBNYKH ZAVEDENII RADIOELEKTRONIKA, 1992, 35 (5-6): : 14 - 28