Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis

被引:1
|
作者
Decarolis, Francesco [1 ,2 ]
Goldmanis, Maris [3 ]
Penta, Antonio [4 ,5 ,6 ]
Shakhgildyan, Ksenia [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Bocconi Univ, Milan, Italy
[2] IGIER, Milan, Italy
[3] Royal Holloway Univ London, Dept Econ, London, England
[4] Univ Pompeu Fabra, ICREA, Barcelona, Spain
[5] Barcelona Sch Econ, Barcelona, Spain
[6] TSE, Toulouse, France
来源
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | 2023年 / 71卷 / 02期
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
D O I
10.1111/joie.12331
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in internet ad auctions. When the same intermediary bids for competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by bid coordination. When the method is applied to data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55% of the cases of delegated bidding and the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3% and 10.4%.
引用
收藏
页码:570 / 592
页数:23
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