Comparisons of the effects of individual and collective performance-related pay on performance: A review

被引:1
|
作者
Wood, Stephen [1 ]
Leoni, Silvia [2 ]
Ladley, Daniel [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Leicester, Sch Business, Leicester LE2 1RQ, England
[2] Univ Maastricht, Sch Business & Econ, Tongersestr 53, NL-6211 LM Maastricht, Netherlands
关键词
Performance-related pay; Collective incentives; Organizational performance; Individual performance; Free riding; Sorting effects; Intrinsic motivation; HUMAN-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY; HIGH COMMITMENT MANAGEMENT; INTRINSIC MOTIVATION; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; REWARD INTERDEPENDENCE; MONETARY INCENTIVES; TEAM PERFORMANCE; WORK GROUPS; PRODUCTIVITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.hrmr.2023.100982
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Debate on whether performance-related pay enhances organizational performance has centred on individual-based systems. This paper reviews studies that compare these with collective-based systems such as team bonuses and profit-sharing. Analysis of such comparisons - both field and experimental studies - reveals that collective systems, either alone or in conjunction with individual systems, are associated with higher performance. In no study do individual incentives outperform collective systems. Tests for moderators were rare but suggest that task interdependency may enhance collective systems' effects. Tests of mediators are also rare but point to enhanced levels of cooperation and idea generation under collective systems. This review examines how the included studies contribute to our understanding of key issues in paymentsystems research - the roles of sorting effects and free riding under collective systems, and whether financial incentives may undermine intrinsic motivation - and finds it is limited, suggesting future work should concentrate on these areas.
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页数:23
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