The police hunch: the Bayesian brain, active inference, and the free energy principle in action

被引:1
|
作者
Stubbs, Gareth [1 ]
Friston, Karl [2 ]
机构
[1] Rabdan Acad, Abu Dhabi, U Arab Emirates
[2] UCL, Inst Neurol, London, England
来源
FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY | 2024年 / 15卷
基金
欧盟地平线“2020”;
关键词
active inference; Bayesian brain; intuition; policing; decision making; suspicion; free energy principle (FEP); INTEROCEPTIVE INFERENCE; DECISION-MAKING; SUSPICION; INTUITION; CULTURE;
D O I
10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1368265
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
In the realm of law enforcement, the "police hunch" has long been a mysterious but crucial aspect of decision-making. Drawing on the developing framework of Active Inference from cognitive science, this theoretical article examines the genesis, mechanics, and implications of the police hunch. It argues that hunches - often vital in high-stakes situations - should not be described as mere intuitions, but as intricate products of our mind's generative models. These models, shaped by observations of the social world and assimilated and enacted through active inference, seek to reduce surprise and make hunches an indispensable tool for officers, in exactly the same way that hypotheses are indispensable for scientists. However, the predictive validity of hunches is influenced by a range of factors, including experience and bias, thus warranting critical examination of their reliability. This article not only explores the formation of police hunches but also provides practical insights for officers and researchers on how to harness the power of active inference to fully understand policing decisions and subsequently explore new avenues for future research.
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页数:11
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