Analysis of global brands' green procurement strategy: Co-opetitive local sourcing vs. overseas sourcing under delivery disruption
被引:4
|
作者:
Niu, Baozhuang
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h-index: 0
机构:
South China Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R ChinaSouth China Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R China
Niu, Baozhuang
[1
]
Xie, Fengfeng
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Nottingham Ningbo China, Nottingham Univ, Business Sch China, Ningbo 315100, Peoples R ChinaSouth China Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R China
Xie, Fengfeng
[2
]
Chen, Lei
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h-index: 0
机构:
Jinan Univ, Sch Management, Guangzhou 510632, Peoples R ChinaSouth China Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R China
Chen, Lei
[3
]
机构:
[1] South China Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou 510640, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Nottingham Ningbo China, Nottingham Univ, Business Sch China, Ningbo 315100, Peoples R China
[3] Jinan Univ, Sch Management, Guangzhou 510632, Peoples R China
Green supply chain;
Global sourcing;
Co-opetition;
Supply Disruption;
SUPPLY-CHAIN;
RISK;
IMPACT;
COORDINATION;
SEQUENCE;
QUALITY;
D O I:
10.1016/j.omega.2023.102991
中图分类号:
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号:
12 ;
1201 ;
1202 ;
120202 ;
摘要:
Recently, black swan events, such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, have caused disrup-tions for the local brand with overseas procurement (BOP) who traditionally purchase remanufactured com-ponents globally. This induces the BOP to find a local alternative supplier, although the remanufactured components without supply disruption can be of high price, and the local supplier has a self-branded business. In this paper, we consider a BOP's strategic sourcing decisions from a local supplier with self-branded end products (LSP) who sells remanufactured components. We focus on the BOP's incentives toward such a "co-opetitive" relationship and the LSP's willingness to sell remanufactured components to the BOP. We find that having two suppliers may induce a component price war but the component price will not become too low when the probability of overseas supply disruption is high. Interestingly, we find that the BOP will allocate a low pro-portion of component purchasing orders to the LSP when it faces a high probability of overseas supply disruption. In contrast, the LSP has the incentive to sell remanufactured components to the BOP when the probability of overseas supply disruption is in a moderate range. If the BOP's remanufactured component quality requirement is high, or the probability of overseas supply disruption is low, the LSP might even have a profit loss when selling components to the BOP.