Upper Bound for the Competitive Facility Location Problem with Demand Uncertainty

被引:0
|
作者
Beresnev, V. L. [1 ,2 ]
Melnikov, A. A. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Russian Acad Sci, Siberian Branch, Sobolev Inst Math, Novosibirsk, Russia
[2] Novosibirsk State Univ, Novosibirsk, Russia
基金
俄罗斯科学基金会;
关键词
bilevel programming; Stackelberg game; competitive facility location; pessimistic optimal solution;
D O I
10.1134/S1064562423600318
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
We consider a competitive facility location problem with two competing parties operating in a situation of uncertain demand scenarios. The problem of finding the best solutions for the parties is formulated as a discrete bilevel mathematical programming problem. A procedure for computing an upper bound for the objective function on solution subsets is suggested. The procedure could be employed in implicit enumeration schemes capable of computing an optimal solution for the problem under study. Within the procedure, additional constraints (cuts) iteratively augment the high-point relaxation of the initial bilevel problem, which strengthens the relaxation and improves the upper bound's quality. A new procedure for generating such cuts is proposed, which allows us to construct the strongest cuts without enumerating the parameters encoding them.
引用
收藏
页码:438 / 442
页数:5
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