When brokers, analysts, and fund managers buy or sell stocks for their own accounts, these "access employees" of financial institutions outperform retail investors over short windows up to a month. They earn particularly high abnormal returns when they trade before earnings announcements, revisions of analyst recommendations, and large stock price changes. We also find evidence consistent with profitable front-running and information leakage around the execution of corporate insider trades and block trades by mutual funds, as well as the release of revised recommendations by analysts who work at the same brokerage firm. (JEL G12, G14, G18) Received December 11, 2021; Editorial decision October 31, 2022 by Editor Jeffrey Pontiff. Authors have furnished an , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
机构:
Arizona State Univ, WP Carey Sch Business, Tempe, AZ 85281 USAArizona State Univ, WP Carey Sch Business, Tempe, AZ 85281 USA
Aragon, George O.
Chung, Ji-Woong
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Korea Univ, Business Sch, Seoul 02841, South KoreaArizona State Univ, WP Carey Sch Business, Tempe, AZ 85281 USA
Chung, Ji-Woong
Kang, Byoung Uk
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Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaArizona State Univ, WP Carey Sch Business, Tempe, AZ 85281 USA
机构:
Natl Intelligence Univ, Coll Strateg Intelligence, Washington, DC USA
Cent Intelligence Agcy, Fairfax, VA USANatl Intelligence Univ, Coll Strateg Intelligence, Washington, DC USA