You Get What You Pay for: An Analysis of Public Contracts for Engineering Services

被引:0
|
作者
de Medeiros-Costa, Caio Cesar [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Brasilia, Management Dept, FACE ADM, Brasilia, DF, Brazil
[2] Univ Brasilia, Darcy Ribeiro Campus S-N, BR-70910900 Brasilia, DF, Brazil
关键词
public procurement; contracts; agency theory; TRANSACTION COSTS; LOCAL-GOVERNMENT; PROCUREMENT; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; INCENTIVES; DETERMINANTS; GOVERNANCE; MARKET; WORKS;
D O I
10.1177/00953997241240404
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
To understand the effects of bidder's strategies on contractual modifications, this study utilized econometric methods and a database containing 5,434 engineering service contracts from Brazilian federal government. The results demonstrate the effects arising from the trade-off between the low prices presented in the contractor selection phase and the contractual performance measured by contract modifications. Competition among bidders in a reverse auction with multiple rounds of bid submissions can exacerbate this trade-off, potentially incentivizing risk-taking strategies by bidders. Subsequently, this may lead to the need for contract modifications to facilitate the ongoing execution of the contract.
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页码:551 / 579
页数:29
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