Does the market differentiate between investor-paid and issuer-paid ratings in the pricing of asset-backed securities?

被引:1
|
作者
Liu, Xiaojian [1 ]
Chong, Beng Soon [2 ]
Feng, Xiaozhi [3 ]
机构
[1] Hunan Univ, Coll Finance & Stat, Changsha, Peoples R China
[2] Nanyang Technol Univ, Nanyang Business Sch, Singapore 639798, Singapore
[3] Univ Macau, Fac Business Adm, Taipa, Macao, Peoples R China
关键词
Issuer -paid rating; Investor -paid rating; Conflicts of interest; Rating inflation; Rating shopping; Rating catering; Rating Informativeness; Rating credibility; MOODYS; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.102027
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the relative effects of investor-paid and issuer-paid ratings on the at-issuance pricing of China's asset-backed securities (ABS). In theory, issuer-paid ratings are more prone to rating inflation but are more informative than investor-paid ratings. Empirically, we find that investorpaid ratings are significantly more conservative than issuer-paid ratings, on average. Also, the market does differentiate between issuer-and investor-paid ratings in ABS pricing. For split rated issues, the yield spread is higher if the inferior rating is from an investor-paid rating agency. Furthermore, the relative credibility of investor-paid ratings over issuer-paid ratings is asymmetric and largely applicable to inferior ratings.
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页数:15
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