Do insurers respond to active purchasing? Evidence from the Massachusetts health insurance exchange

被引:2
|
作者
Shepard, Mark [1 ]
Forsgren, Ethan [2 ]
机构
[1] NBER, Harvard Kennedy Sch, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] UCLA, Los Angeles, CA USA
关键词
active purchasing; insurance competition; insurance exchanges; CARE REFORM; MARKETPLACES; COMPETITION; COST;
D O I
10.1111/jori.12414
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Health insurance markets face continued challenges with high premiums and limited insurer competition. We describe a unique set of "active purchasing" policies used by Massachusetts' pioneer health insurance exchange to shape the rules of competition and reward lower-price insurers with additional customers. We provide evidence that these policies significantly influenced insurer pricing. Between 2010 and 2013, over 80% of insurer prices were set exactly at or within 1% of pricing thresholds created by active purchasing policies. A key "limited choice" policy was associated with a 16%-20% reduction in average insurance prices relative to comparison markets in 2012-2014. Insurers achieved these price cuts partly through cost reductions via narrower provider networks and partly through reduced profit margins.
引用
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页码:9 / 31
页数:23
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