Measuring Active Purchasing in Healthcare: Analysing Reallocations of Funds Between Providers to Evaluate Purchasing Systems Performance in the Netherlands

被引:0
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作者
Stadhouders, Niek Waltherus [1 ]
Koolmani, Xander [2 ]
Tanke, Marit A. C. [1 ]
Maarse, Hans [3 ]
Jeurissen, Patrick P. T. [1 ]
机构
[1] Radboud Univ Nijmegen, Sci Inst Qual Healthcare IQ Healthcare, Med Ctr, Nijmegen, Netherlands
[2] Vrije Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Amsterdam, Netherlands
[3] Maastricht Univ, Fac Hlth Med & Life Sci, Sch Publ Hlth & Primary Care Caphri, Dept Hlth Serv Res, Maastricht, Netherlands
关键词
SINGLE-PAYER; PREFERRED PROVIDERS; MANAGED COMPETITION; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; MARKET SHARE; POLICY; QUALITY; INSURANCE; EFFICIENCY; COSTS;
D O I
10.34172/ijhpm.2023.7506
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
Background: Purchasing systems aim to improve resource allocation in healthcare markets. The Netherlands is characterized by four different purchasing systems: managed competition in the hospital market, a non-competitive single payer system for long-term care (LTC), municipal procurement for home care and social services, and self -procurement via personal budgets. We hypothesize that managed competition and competitive payer reforms boost reallocations of provider market share by means of active purchasing, ie, redistributing funds from high-quality providers to low-quality providers. Methods: We define a Market Activity Index (MAI) as the sum of funds reallocated between providers annually. Provider expenditures are extracted from provider financial statements between 2006 and 2019. We compare MAI in six healthcare sectors under four different purchasing systems, adjusting for reforms, and market entry/exit. Next, we perform in-depth analyses on the hospital market. Using multivariate linear regressions, we relate reallocations to selective contracting, provider quality, and market characteristics. Results: No difference was found between reallocations in the hospital care market under managed competition and the non-competitive single payer LTC (MAI between 2% and 3%), while MAI was markedly higher under procurement by municipalities and personal budget holders (between 5% and 15%). While competitive reforms temporarily increased MAI, no structural effects were found. Relatively low hospital MAI could not be explained by market characteristics. Furthermore, the extent of selective contracting or hospital quality differences had no significant effects on reallocations of funds. Conclusion: Dutch managed competition and competitive purchaser reforms had no discernible effect on reallocations of funds between providers. This casts doubt on the mechanisms advocated by managed competition and active purchasing to improve allocative efficiency. Keywords: Managed Competition, Purchasing, Efficiency, Hospitals, The Netherlands Copyright: (c) 2023 The Author(s); Published by Kerman University of Medical Sciences. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Citation: Stadhouders NW, Koolman X, Tanke MAC, Maarse H, Jeurissen PPT. Measuring active purchasing in healthcare: analysing reallocations of funds between providers to evaluate purchasing systems performance in the Netherlands. Int J Health Policy Manag. 2023;12:7506. doi:10.34172/ijhpm.2023.7506
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页数:12
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