Bondholder representatives on bank boards: A device for market discipline

被引：0
|
作者：
Distinguin, Isabelle [1 ]
Lepetit, Laetitia [1 ]
Strobel, Frank [2 ]
Tran, Phan Huy Hieu [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Limoges, LAPE, Limoges, France
[2] Univ Birmingham, Dept Econ, Birmingham, England
[3] Univ Bourgogne Franche Comte, Burgundy Sch Business, CEREN EA 7477, Dijon, France
来源：
ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 2023年 / 61卷 / 03期
关键词：
bank risk; board of directors; bondholder representatives; market discipline; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FINANCIAL EXPERTISE; YIELD SPREADS; RISK; OWNERSHIP; IMPACT; DIRECTORS; PERFORMANCE; BEHAVIOR; MODEL;
D O I：
10.1111/ecin.13137
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We examine whether board representation of bondholders can be an effective market discipline mechanism to reduce bank risk, using a unique dataset combining information on bondholders and boards of directors of European listed banks. Our results show that the influence of bondholder representatives on the bank board significantly reduces bank risk without impacting profitability. The beneficial effect of this market discipline mechanism is stronger when bondholder representatives have regulatory experience, current or long relationships with their affiliated bondholders, and for more complex banks. In contrast, the reducing impact on bank risk is smaller for banks with lower capitalization levels.
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页码：738 / 765
页数：28
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