Regulatory reforms, board independence and earnings quality

被引:4
|
作者
Amin, Qazi Awais [1 ]
Cumming, Douglas [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Nottingham Trent Univ, Nottingham Business Sch, Dept Accounting & Finance, Nottingham, England
[2] Florida Atlantic Univ, Coll Business, Finance & Entrepreneurship, Boca Raton, FL USA
[3] Univ Birmingham, Birmingham Business Sch, Birmingham, England
关键词
Board independence; Earnings management; Corporate governance regulations; Board education; Board tenure; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; REAL ACTIVITIES; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION; FIRM PERFORMANCE; CEO COMPENSATION; AUDIT COMMITTEES; SARBANES-OXLEY; MANAGEMENT; ASSOCIATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.intfin.2023.101840
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate the exogenous increase in the proportion of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in response to the corporate governance regulations 2012 in Singapore and Vietnam to estimate the effectiveness of INEDs in restraining earnings management. We also investigate the moderating effect of two important characteristics of INEDs: education and tenure on the relationship between regulations 2012 and earnings management. Our core findings show that voluntary adopters with better INEDs education and optimal tenure experience a significant decrease in earnings management compared to mandatory adopters with lower of INEDseducation and suboptimal tenure.
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页数:20
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