Toward Parsimony in Bias Research: A Proposed Common Framework of Belief-Consistent Information Processing for a Set of Biases

被引:35
|
作者
Oeberst, Aileen [1 ,2 ]
Imhoff, Roland [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Hagen, Dept Media Psychol, Hagen, Germany
[2] Leibniz Inst Wissensmedien, Tubingen, Germany
[3] Johannes Gutenberg Univ Mainz, Dept Social & Legal Psychol, Mainz, Germany
关键词
biased information processing; beliefs; belief-consistent information processing; IN-GROUP FAVORITISM; HINDSIGHT BIAS; CONFIRMATION BIAS; SELF-ENHANCEMENT; EXPECTANCY CONFIRMATION; PERSPECTIVE-TAKING; INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES; MOTIVATED SKEPTICISM; ILLUSORY CORRELATION; POSITIVE ILLUSIONS;
D O I
10.1177/17456916221148147
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
One of the essential insights from psychological research is that people's information processing is often biased. By now, a number of different biases have been identified and empirically demonstrated. Unfortunately, however, these biases have often been examined in separate lines of research, thereby precluding the recognition of shared principles. Here we argue that several-so far mostly unrelated-biases (e.g., bias blind spot, hostile media bias, egocentric/ethnocentric bias, outcome bias) can be traced back to the combination of a fundamental prior belief and humans' tendency toward belief-consistent information processing. What varies between different biases is essentially the specific belief that guides information processing. More importantly, we propose that different biases even share the same underlying belief and differ only in the specific outcome of information processing that is assessed (i.e., the dependent variable), thus tapping into different manifestations of the same latent information processing. In other words, we propose for discussion a model that suffices to explain several different biases. We thereby suggest a more parsimonious approach compared with current theoretical explanations of these biases. We also generate novel hypotheses that follow directly from the integrative nature of our perspective.
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页码:1464 / 1487
页数:24
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