Naive Realism Face to Face with the Time Lag Argument

Naive realists traditionally reject the time lag argument by replying that we can be in a direct visual perceptual relation to temporally distant facts or objects. I first show that this answer entails that some visual perceptions-i.e., those that are direct relation between us and an external material object that has visually changed, or ceased to exist, during the time lag-should also count as illusions and hallucinations, respectively. I then examine the possible attempts by the naive realist to tell such perceptions apart from illusions and hallucinations, and after showing the inadequacy of the answers relying on a mere counterfactual or causal criterion, I explain why the problem is solved by introducing a view of visual perception as temporally extended into the past of objects and, in particular, as consisting in the whole causal chain of events or states of affairs going from external material object x to subject S. But this solution is not immune from defects for the naive realist. I show that this view of perception raises a number of significant concerns, hence leaving the issue of the time lag problem still open for naive realism.