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AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR VACCINE PRIORITIZATION
被引:0
|作者:
Akbarpour, Mohammad
[1
]
Budish, Eric
Dworczak, Piotr
Kominers, Scott Duke
机构:
[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源:
关键词:
OPTIMAL ALLOCATION;
AUCTION;
DESIGN;
SYSTEM;
TAX;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
We propose an economic framework for determining the optimal allocation of a scarce supply of vaccines that become gradually available during a public health crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Agents differ in observable and unobservable characteristics, and the designermaximizes a social welfare function over all feasible mechanisms-accounting for agents' characteristics, as well as their endogenous behavior in the face of the pandemic. The framework emphasizes the role of externalities and incorporates equity as well as efficiency concerns. Our results provide an economic justification for providing vaccines immediately and for free to some groups of agents, while at the same time showing that a carefully constructed pricing mechanism can improve outcomes by screening for individuals with the highest private and social benefits of receiving the vaccine. The solution casts light on the classic question of whether prices or priorities should be used to allocate scarce public resources under externalities and equity concerns.
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页码:359 / 417
页数:59
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