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Corporate corruption and future audit fees: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment
被引:4
|作者:
Hu, Juncheng
[1
]
Li, Xiaorong
[2
]
Wan, Zhong
[2
,3
]
机构:
[1] Bond Univ, Bond Business Sch, Robina, Australia
[2] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Finance & Taxat, Beijing, Peoples R China
[3] Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 10010, Peoples R China
基金:
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词:
Corruption;
Audit fees;
Anti-corruption campaign;
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT;
PARTY TRANSACTIONS;
GOVERNMENT;
GUANXI;
OWNERSHIP;
BRIBERY;
GOVERNANCE;
PROTECTION;
DYNAMICS;
CAMPAIGN;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100367
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Using a difference-in-differences estimation that relies on China's anti-corruption cam-paign as a regulatory shock, we report that an exogenous reduction in firm-level corruption leads to lower future audit fees. Further triple difference analyses reveal that the decrease in future audit fees is more significant for firms operating in regions with weak legal envi-ronments, strong government control, and weak property rights protection. Government subsidies and related party transactions are channels through which the anti-corruption campaign affects future audit fees. Compared to previous literature, we conclude the effect of corruption on future audit fees is causal. (c) 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页数:21
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