The impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage

被引:0
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作者
Jiamin Liu [1 ]
Yalin Jiang [2 ]
Shengdao Gan [3 ]
Ran Chen [4 ]
机构
[1] School of Economics and Management, Hubei University of Technology
[2] School of Social Audit, Nanjing Audit University
[3] Business School, Sichuan University
[4] Postdoctoral Research Workstation, Anhui Rural Credit Union
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中图分类号
F275 [企业财务管理]; F842.69 []; F832.51 [];
学科分类号
020204 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 120404 ;
摘要
The governance effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance(D&O insurance), an important tool for risk diversification, are of strong concern in the capital market. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from2009 to 2018, we examine the impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage. We find that D&O insurance is negatively associated with excess corporate leverage and that this result is consistent with a series of robustness tests. Further analyses show that D&O insurance impedes excess corporate leverage mainly because of its effect on external monitoring. The effect is more pronounced for firms that are state-owned, have political connections and are located in provinces with low marketization than for other firms.
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页码:66 / 88
页数:23
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