Refutation of Kripke’s Epistemic Argument against Descriptivism

被引：0

作者：

Chen Bo Institute of Foreign Philosophy

机构：

来源：

学术界 | 2011年 / 05期

关键词：

Refutation of Kripke’s Epistemic Argument against Descriptivism;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

H0 [语言学];

学科分类号：

030303 ; 0501 ; 050102 ;

摘要：

Let "N" stand for a name,"the F" for some description(s) corresponding to N,and "P" for premise,"C" for the conclusion.Then,Kripke’s epistemic argument against descriptivism can be summarized as follows.P1 If descriptivism is correct,"N is the F" should be knowable a priori.P2 In fact,

引用

页码：272 / 279

页数：8

共 11 条

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