基于委托代理视角的环境规制监督系统设计

被引：5

作者：

郭庆 ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] 山东财经大学经济学院

来源：

关键词：

环境规制; 监督系统; 委托代理;

D O I：

10.13962/j.cnki.37-1486/f.2012.06.001

中图分类号：

X321 [区域环境规划与管理];

学科分类号：

083305 ; 1204 ;

摘要：

有效的监督是实现环境规制目标的重要条件。基于委托代理的视角,环境规制的监督对象应该包括政府部门、环境规制机构和排污企业。对影响我国环境规制监督效率相关因素的具体分析显示,环境规制过程中有效的监督需要通过针对不同监督对象,综合运用制度与技术手段的监督系统来完成,据此提出了环境规制监督系统的设计思路。

引用

页码：32 / 38

页数：7

共 14 条

[1] Multiple re-ceptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmen-tal taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions. Gregory Colsona,Luisa Menapaceb. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management . 2012
[2] No chance for incentive-oriented environmental policies in representative democracies? A Public Choice analysis
Schneider, F
Volkert, J
[J]. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS, 1999, 31 (01) : 123 - 138
[3] Leading issues in domestic environmental regulation: A review essay[J] . Amitrajeet A. Batabyal. &nbspEcological Economics . 1995 (1)
[4] Enforcementmissions:targets vs.budgets. Anthony Heyes,Sandeep Kapur. Journal of Environmental Eco-nomics and Management . 2009
[5] Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Becker GS. Journal of Politics . 1968
[6] Monitoring versusincentives. Demougin,D,Fluet,C. European Economic Review . 2001
[7] Leading Issues in Domestic Environmental Regulation: A Review Essay. Batabyal,A. A. Ecological Economics . 1995
[8] Monitoring versus incentives
Demougin, D
Fluet, C
[J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2001, 45 (09) : 1741 - 1764
[9] No chance for incentive-oriented environmental policies in representative democracies? A public choice analysis. Schneider,F.,Volkert,J. Ecological Economics . 1999
[10] 环境规制约束下的企业行为[M]. 经济科学出版社 , 张嫚, 2006