This paper explores the role of British anti-communist anxieties in shaping policies and strategies towards Mandatory Palestine during the critical years of 1946-1949. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, British policymakers viewed Jewish immigration and Zionist aspirations as potential vehicles for Soviet influence in the Middle East. Key officials, including Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, were deeply concerned that the establishment of a Jewish state could create a Soviet-aligned entity, threatening British imperial interests and regional stability. This article draws on extensive primary sources to analyse how these fears influenced British responses to illegal immigration, Zionist militancy, and the broader geopolitical dynamics with the United States. While past scholarship has primarily focused on Arab considerations in British policy, this study highlights the significant yet underexplored factor of anti-communism. It argues that Cold War paranoia profoundly shaped British strategies, from counter-insurgency efforts and naval blockades to diplomatic campaigns in America designed to frame Zionism as a communist threat. However, these fears led to flawed assumptions about Soviet influence within the Yishuv and Aliyah Bet operations. Ultimately, this article contributes to understanding how Cold War anxieties intersected with decolonisation and the Israeli state's formation, reflecting Britain's struggle to maintain global influence amidst shifting geopolitical realities.