Welfare paternalism and objections from equality

Informed by behavioral science research, recent defenses of paternalism point to people's need for help in making and carrying out good decisions. Authors in this literature typically focus on defending paternalist policies against objections that frame them as threats to autonomy. But they often neglect a second category of objections to paternalism. Paternalism expresses disrespect not only for the target's autonomy but also for her equal status. I argue that this second kind of wrong is more independent of autonomy-based objections than has been recognized. Therefore, we need to evaluate paternalism in two dimensions, rather than treating egalitarian objections as a mere supplement to autonomy concerns. This allows us to see why welfare paternalism can be objectionable even when choices are not significantly constrained or when the choices at stake are relatively trivial. The barrier to justifiable welfare paternalist policies has less to do with the specific techniques of influence adopted than with their asymmetrical distribution and the inegalitarian structures through which they are delivered.