A Survey of Side-Channel Attacks in Superconducting Quantum Computers

Quantum computers have garnered significant attention recently, owing to their potential to surpass the computational capabilities of classical systems. However, stringent operational requirements render quantum computing devices inherently costly. To democratize access to quantum computers, efforts have been made to make these devices accessible via cloud platforms. This has led to multiple users gaining access to the same quantum computers sequentially through cloud-based interfaces. However, quantum computers today are susceptible to noise, which causes computational errors. Compounded with widespread user access, this susceptibility opens avenues for side-channel threats within quantum computing systems, where malicious users may exploit these vulnerabilities to intercept and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information. Given the wide-ranging applicability of quantum computing across various domains, the ramifications of confidential information leakage can be detrimental. In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive exploration of existing side-channel attack vectors targeting quantum computing systems, along with an analysis of their implications aiming to facilitate the development of secure and accessible quantum computing systems.