Subnational immigration policymaking in the United States: the role of issue entrepreneurs in California, Texas, and Florida

被引:0
|
作者
Cornelius, Wayne A. [1 ]
Varsanyi, Monica W. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Polit Sci, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[2] CUNY Grad Ctr, New York, NY USA
关键词
Immigration policy; immigration federalism; political polarization; issue entrepreneurs; ENFORCEMENT; CITIES;
D O I
10.1080/1369183X.2024.2441831
中图分类号
C921 [人口统计学];
学科分类号
摘要
This article explores the role of restrictive issue entrepreneurs in furthering immigration federalism in the United States. We define such entrepreneurs as political actors who promote restrictions on immigration to get votes and enhance their own political careers. Research has identified the variables that most strongly predict the passage of immigration-related legislation at the state and local levels, but less understood are the actual mechanisms that result in legislative and executive action. Following Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan [(2015). The New Immigration Federalism. New York: Cambridge University Press], we argue that restrictive issue entrepreneurs play a key role in intensifying political polarization and cultural anxieties of voters around immigration issues. They propose anti-immigration laws and policies, shepherd these measures through the legislative process, and defend them in the federal court system. Using a qualitative case study design, we focus on three state governors: Pete Wilson (CA), Greg Abbott (TX), and Ron DeSantis (FL). We argue that Abbott and DeSantis represent a new breed of anti-immigrant issue entrepreneurs, who use subnational policies to signal opposition to the federal government for personal political gain, and create new models for immigration control policies. Congressional deadlock on immigration reform has created unprecedented opportunities for subnational issue entrepreneurs .
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页数:19
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