This study investigates the role played by the British Military Intelligence Division and more specifically, its subdivision, the Field Intelligence Department, in South Africa during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. It starts with a brief overview of the sound work done by this division prior to the war. In 1896, an important new dispensation dawned with the appointment of Maj.-Gen. Sir John Ardagh as Director of Military Intelligence. Despite a limited budget the Military Intelligence Division did excellent work. Between 1896 and 1899 it prepared twelve reports with a view to the possibility of war in South Africa. The highlight of this preparatory work was the publication of a guide, Military notes on the Dutch republics of South Africa. The role played by the Field Intelligence Department (South Africa) in the defeats suffered by the British during "Black Week" (10 to 15 December 1899) next receives attention, as does the heavy storm of criticism that erupted in Britain over "Black Week". This criticism of the Military Intelligence Division is largely unwarranted. Given its lack of funds and authority within the War Office it accomplished much, notably its accurate findings on the number of Boers liable for miltary service, the number and types of Boer armaments and the intentions of the Boer military leaders. There was indeed an initial lack of accurate mapping of the probable operational area. However, in the last eighteen months of the war the Topographical Section issued several maps, based on existing maps and reconnaissance, compiled for the most part by intelligence officers of the various columns. When Lord Roberts replaced Gen. Sir Redvers Buller as commander-in-chief of the British troops in South Africa in January 1900, intelligence improved dramatically. The Boers' guerrilla warfare from the mid-1900s forced Roberts to apply counter-guerrilla tactics and split his force into smaller mobile units to gain better intelligence about Boer assaults. Between February 1901 and the end of the war on 31 May 1902, Lt.-Col. David Henderson the Director of the Field Intelligence Department (South Africa) made an important contribution to the effectiveness of the intelligence system. He divided the operational area into four districts - the Transvaal, Orange River Colony, the Cape Colony south of the Orange River, and Kimberley. These districts were then subdivided into sub-districts. A staff officer was placed in charge of each and was given the responsibility of collecting information on the enemy in his sub-district. It was his duty to supply the columns with interpreters, guides, scouts and maps. He also had to pass on relevant information received from his own agents, from columns in adjoining districts, and from headquarters in Pretoria. The staff officer was also required to send a telegraph to Henderson on Sunday evenings, providing a weekly summary of the situation in his sub-district. Where did the Field Intelligence Department (South Africa) get its information other than from its own scouts? It is clear that some Boers acted as British spies and there is also evidence that black people provided the department with information. An important source on intelligence activity was the private diaries and other documents that were confiscated from Boer prisoners of war. The point also made is that even when scouts gained valuable intelligence, problems arose with communication and this caused operations to fail. During the guerrilla phase the number of people working for the Field Intelligence Department (South Africa) increased dramatically, largely because the independent units now had their own intelligence officers. The department did good work in South Africa, but the Boer intelligence system was so efficient that they were able to outmanoeuver the British troops, even when the Field Intelligence Department (South Africa) had accurate intelligence of their strength and disposition. In conclusion, two diaries taken from Boer prisoners of war that were translated by the Intelligence staff are analysed to determine their possible value for British intelligence.
