Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions

被引：0
|
作者：
O'Keefe, Matthew [1 ]
机构：
[1] Vanderbilt Univ, Dept Econ, VU Stn B 351819,2301 Vanderbilt Pl, Nashville 37235, TN USA
来源：
ENERGY JOURNAL | 2025年
关键词：
restructured electricity markets; congestion revenue; financial transmission rights; imperfect competition; multiunit auctions; NETWORKS;
D O I：
10.1177/01956574241303737
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper explores market participants' incentives to exercise unilateral market power in financial transmission rights (FTR) auctions. I present a model of strategic bidding in FTR auctions that illustrates how the standard market clearing mechanism for FTR auctions facilitates cross-path competition, limiting the profitability of demand reduction. Simulation evidence suggests that this force can dramatically reduce rents from unilateral market power relative to other sources of auction revenue shortfalls, highlighting potential adverse effects from proposed market reforms such as decentralized FTR sales and bidding-path restrictions that may weaken cross-path competition.JEL Classification: D44, D47, Q49
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页数：20
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