Aesthetic fascination and separation of judgments in the imitation of negative prototypes: cases of reversal in mimesis

Since the beginning of Modernity, narrative has evolved as much as thought has, and this has been substantially appreciated in the twists and turns of taste and in the construction of characters. Under this premise, this article analyzes the differences between exemplary and non-exemplary prototypes in fiction, focusing on the audiovisual medium. Based on the theory of imitation and the imitation of prototypes established by Javier Gom & aacute;, we review some archetypes of amoral characters that, sharing their non-exemplary character, arouse an aesthetic fascination contrary to the one they provoke in the field of morality. In order to explain this phenomenon, the separation of judgments established by Friedrich Schiller and by other theorists who follow in his wake, such as Adam Kotsko, is used, and the possible contradictions implicit in the amoral facet of the characters are pointed out, when their non-exemplary character is a reference for specific social sectors, turning fiction into the starting point of the imitative process.