Controlling shareholders' ' stock pledges and greenwashing-Evidence - Evidence from China

被引:0
|
作者
Li, Jiao [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Int Business & Econ, Business Sch, 10 Huixin East St, Beijing 100029, Peoples R China
关键词
Controlling shareholder; Share pledge; Greenwashing; Corporate governance; SHARE PLEDGES; CORPORATE; PERFORMANCE; LEGITIMACY;
D O I
10.1016/j.frl.2024.106227
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines whether controlling shareholders' stock pledges may affect greenwashing. Controlling shareholders' stock pledges can increase the commitment of controlling shareholders and reduce their risk-taking willingness. Both the existence and the percentage of controlling shareholders' stock pledges are negatively related to greenwashing. The findings are robust to the 2SLS estimation with IV, PSM, entropy balancing, and other tests. Moreover, the effect is stronger for long-term stock pledges, suggesting that the longer duration of stock pledges may serve as a stronger motivation for controlling shareholders to restrain misconduct, which provides important insights on how to address greenwashing amid growing environmental concerns.
引用
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页数:8
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