Dual Sources, the Consequence Argument, and Ultimate Responsibility: A Reply to Turner and Wessling

In a pair of recent articles, P. Roger Turner and Jordan Wessling argue that my "Dual Sources Account" fails in its attempt to show that human acts can be caused by God and yet still be free in the libertarian sense. In one article, they maintain that Dual Sources succumbs to a theological version of the Consequence Argument. In a second article, they maintain that Dual Sources fails to accommodate our ultimate responsibility for our actions. This paper offers a defense of Dual Sources against these objections. In the course of this defense, the paper will offer a succinct overview of the Dual Sources account, consider three different theological versions of the Consequence Argument, discuss the relationship between causality, priority, and explanation, and consider the requisites for ultimate responsibility. In doing so, the paper extends the defense of Dual Sources beyond where it stands in the current literature.